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Sub-ﬁle hashing and hash-based carving are increasingly popular methods in digital fo-
rensics to detect ﬁles on hard drives that are incomplete or have been partially over-
written/modiﬁed. While these techniques have been shown to be usable in practice and
can be implemented efﬁciently, they face the problem that a-priori speciﬁc “target ﬁles”
need to be available and at hand. While it is always feasible and, in fact, trivial to create
case-speciﬁc sub-ﬁle hash collections, we propose the creation of case-independent sub-
ﬁle hash databases. For facilitating hash databases which can be publicly shared among
investigators, we propose the usage of data from peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing networks such
as BitTorrent. Most of the ﬁle sharing networks in use today rely on large quantities of hash
values for integrity checking and chunk identiﬁcation, and can be leveraged for digital
forensics.
In this paper we show how these hash values can be of use for identifying possibly vast
amounts of data and thus present a feasible solution to cope with the ever-increasing case
sizes in digital forensics today. While the methodology used is independent of the used ﬁle
sharing protocol, we harvested information from the BitTorrent network. In total we
collected and analyzed more than 3.2 billion hash values from 2.3 million torrent ﬁles, and
discuss to what extent they can be used to identify otherwise unknown ﬁle fragments and
data remnants. Using open-source tools like bulk_extractor and hashdb, these hash values
can be directly used to enhance the effectiveness of sub-ﬁle hashing at scale.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
One of the current problems in digital forensics is the
vast amount of data to be analyzed, as hard drives with
8 terabytes capacity are readily available and the number of
devices per person increases steadily. Both are factors for
which the current forensic process model does not scale
well (Garﬁnkel, 2010). Acquisition of large data drives can
take days, and even though optimization techniques were
introduced in the literature recently e.g., sifting collectorsrg (S. Neuner),
ker), eweippl@sba-
vier Ltd. This is an open acc(Richard and Grier, 2015) or ﬁle-based deduplication
(Neuner et al.), they are not yet used in practice on a larger
scale. Slack space, the general availability of counter-
forensic tools and increasing importance of RAM content
for analysis further challenge the current boundaries of
digital forensics. While ﬁle whitelisting is a common
approach to reduce the number of ﬁles to be investigated
by an investigator, it is limited in numerous ways: for one,
there is currently just one large corpus of hash values
which is publicly shared e the NIST National Software
Reference Library, containing 43 million ﬁle hashes. Sec-
ondly, these ﬁle hash values rely on hashing an entire ﬁle,
and are thus unusable for identifying ﬁles that are partially
modiﬁed, or ﬁles which have been deleted and partially
overwritten.ess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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methodology to identify ﬁles and ﬁle fragments based on
data from publicly available ﬁle-sharing networks. It is
based on the open-source forensic tools bulk_extractor and
hashdb, and can be readily integrated in forensic processes.
It improves the current state-of-the-art on sub-ﬁle hashing
(Garﬁnkel and McCarrin, 2015) twofold: for one the hashed
sub-ﬁle parts are larger than pure sector-based hashes, and
thus less prone to false-positives for ﬁles that share com-
mon data segments. Secondly, we solve the problem that an
a-priori sub-ﬁle hash database is required by creating one
that can be shared openly. Lastly, no participation in ﬁle-
sharing activity is needed as the torrent metadata or
“metainfo”, which is stored in the torrent ﬁle, already
contains all the necessary information including the sub-
ﬁle hash values. This information can then be used for ﬁle
and fragment identiﬁcation and effective ﬁle whitelisting,
as well as for other use cases. As such, the contributions of
this paper are as follows:
 We present a scalable methodology for identifying ﬁles
and ﬁle fragments based on sub-ﬁle hashing and P2P ﬁle
sharing information.
 We collect and analyze more than 2.3 million torrent
ﬁles, rendering up to 2.6 petabyte of data identiﬁable
using that information.
 We identify several use cases for ﬁle (fragment) identi-
ﬁcation in the context of both ﬁle-whitelisting and
blacklisting with that data.
 All obtained data and created source code is available
online at https://www.peekatorrent.org.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides the necessary background for this paper.
Section 3 describes our idea of using sub-ﬁle hash values
from peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing networks in the forensic
process, and discusses different use cases where this data
can be of value. Section 4 describes our collected data,
while the possible beneﬁts are described in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses limitations and future work, before we
conclude in Section 7.Background
Digital forensics relies on a multitude of information
sources to gain knowledge, ranging from hard drives and
ﬁle system artefacts (Carrier, 2005), the dynamic content of
RAM (Ligh et al., 2014), up to the user ﬁles and programs
that store information in log ﬁles, SQLite databases, or
digital images. This leaves the investigator with a broad
spectrum of places where to look, and each investigation
depends in its speciﬁc context and questions to be
answered. The general process outline has been deﬁned in
both (Brezinski and Killalea, 2002) and (Kent et al.),
whereas a great number of current challenges has been
discussed in (Garﬁnkel, 2010). Another problem is the
increasing spectrum of devices in use, ranging from
smartphones (Hoog, 2011) to smart TVs and numerous
other types of devices. Most pressing, however, is the
general problem that the average case size is constantlyincreasing (Roussev et al., 2013). For one this is due to
increasing storage capacities of hard drives, with modern
hard drives being able to store many terabytes of data that
needs to be analyzed with respect to the traditional
approach for digital forensics. Secondly, cloud storage ser-
vices commonly push information from one device to
others automatically, like pictures taken or ﬁles edited,
leading to duplicate ﬁles across devices. Lastly, the density
of digital devices surrounding us is increasing, with the
average number of devices per user increasing.
Numerous forensic models and publications in recent
years were speciﬁcally targeted to reduce the manual work
needed in investigations with a large amount of data to be
analyzed. Among them is the concept of forensic triage,
which was initially presented in 2006 (Rogers et al., 2006)
and more recently quantiﬁed regarding the expected
amount of computational power needed in (Roussev et al.,
2013). The basic idea is that instead of analyzing all the data
there is, only a speciﬁc subset of ﬁles which are known to
be of interest are inspected. More recently the concept of
sifting collectors was proposed (Richard and Grier, 2015) in
which the amount of data to be analyzes is reduced by
ignoring known areas on hard drives that are of no
particular interest, yet still retaining the ability to create
bit-identical images if needed. Our approach is different in
that it extends the traditional process of forensic imaging
by identifying large volumes of both ﬁles and ﬁle fragments
to be either of particular interest (blacklisting), or not of any
interest at all as the ﬁle is a known-good ﬁle (whitelisting).
Both bulk_extractor and hashdb are two very powerful
open-source tools which were published recently by Sim-
son Garﬁnkel. Bulk_extractor (Garﬁnkel, 2013) recursively
scans hard drive content using scanners, and is able to
retrieve information in compressed as well as embedded
ﬁles like PDFs. It is extremely fast, and can use all available
cores on a machine to parallelize the task at hand. Hashdb
(Garﬁnkel and McCarrin, 2015) uses efﬁcient algorithms to
build a lookup database of hash values, much faster than
any relational or NoSQL-style database system. It can reli-
ably identify the presence of a given list of target ﬁle hash
values, and builds on previous work that showed that there
is only a small percentage in shared ﬁle content on the
sector level (Young et al., 2012).
P2P networks for hash values
The basic idea of our approach is to extend the existing
knowledge and applicability on sub-ﬁle hashing and hash-
based carving by leveraging vast amounts of publicly
available hash values.While previously hashingwasmainly
used to uniquely identify entire ﬁles of arbitrary size, our
concept presented here extends this to hashing variable-
sized sub-ﬁles portions. Sub-ﬁle hashing (Young et al.,
2012) as well as hash-based carving (Garﬁnkel et al.,
2010) allow investigators to search for ﬁle fragments by
hashing either each hard drive sector, or aligned blocks of
data. This can also be used if not enough time is available to
prove stochastically the presence or absence of speciﬁc ﬁles
e.g. in well below an hour and with only a relatively small
error margin. We extend these concepts by mapping sub-
ﬁle hashes with data from peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing
1 Online at http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/.
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and white-listing for large volumes of ﬁles as well as
sampling. We thus extend existing tools and concepts, such
as bulk analysis of forensic media using bulk_extractor
(Garﬁnkel, 2013) and hashdb (Garﬁnkel and McCarrin,
2015).
Peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle sharing applications and pro-
tocols rely heavily on hashing today, both for integrity and
as a foundation for parallelization i.e., downloading mul-
tiple parts of a ﬁle simultaneously from different users for
increased performance. While we used the popular Bit-
Torrent ﬁle format for our evaluation, any application that
uses sub-ﬁle hashing is in many cases directly usable:
Dropbox as an example, a popular cloud storage service,
hashes blocks of 4 megabytes using SHA-256, and stores
them in a local SQLite database (Mulazzani et al., 2011;
Kholia and Wegrzyn, 2013). These sub-ﬁle hash databases
can also be created and maintained privately, say for
example based on ﬁles and information within a company
or an investigative bureau across cases. Our contribution in
particular is to propose that these pre-computed hash lists
can be used to identify ﬁles and sub-ﬁles on hard drives.
With millions and millions of torrent ﬁles publicly shared
online, PeekaTorrent uses the fact that each and every
torrent ﬁle indexes all ﬁles and also contains their corre-
sponding SHA-1 hash values. For efﬁciency, the ﬁles are
split into equally sized pieces, or chunks, solely depending
on the overall size of information to be shared (Cohen), in
powers of 2 starting with 16 kb. Thus, by splitting the hard
drives into equally sized chunks and hashing them using
SHA-1, it becomes a matter of comparing hash values to
possibly identify hard drive content without relying on ﬁle
system metadata. Also, this information is freely available
without participating in any form of ﬁle sharing activities,
but leveraging the initial seeders computing power in
hashing any form of content.
Torrent ﬁles have a rather simple structure (Cohen):
they contain generic information like when the torrent was
created, which software was used, as well as the speciﬁc
information of the data to be shared. This includes the size
of the blocks, their SHA-1 hash values, and how many of
them there are. During the creation of the torrent ﬁle, all
containing ﬁles are concatenated and this stream of data is
then split into equally sized blocks of data (except for the
last one which does not need to be aligned with the block
length). By default, the data is split into 256 kilobyte blocks,
but the user can specify arbitrary block sizes during the
creation of the torrent ﬁle. The size of the torrent ﬁle de-
pends mostly on the number of blocks, as for each block it
contains a SHA-1 hash value of 20 bytes. To uniquely
identify the torrent for both clients and trackers, a SHA-1
hash value is calculated over a subset of the torrents'
stored information: the so-called info_hash. Fig. 1 shows a
graphical representation of the ﬁle format, as well as an
example from a speciﬁc torrent ﬁle. The dashed line is the
information which is hashed to obtain the info_hash value,
while for each ﬁle the dictionary ﬁles contains the relative
path and the length of the ﬁle. Piece length is the block size
in which the data is split (in the order speciﬁed in the ﬁles
ﬁeld), and the ﬁeld pieces contains the concatenated SHA-1
hash values.Problem of non-aligned ﬁles
One of the problems with the use of torrent ﬁles is the
way these ﬁles are created: prior to hashing all chunks, the
ﬁles are concatenated (in arbitrary order). For each chunk
that contains parts of two ﬁles, we cannot use the resulting
hash value. This means that only ﬁles which are larger than
the piece length can be identiﬁed, thus biasing the general
applicability towards large ﬁles (which is obvious when
looking at content of ﬁle sharing networks). Fig. 2 shows a
representation of block hashes in torrents, with the same
content as Fig. 1: the SHA-1 value of the ﬁrst piece is usable,
as codec.exe spans into the second piece. As such it can be
used to uniquely identify that this ﬁle has been stored on
the hard drive by hashing any hard drive with the same
hashingwindow as the piece_length of the torrent. This can
be readily integrated into bulk_extractor, which already
facilitates the necessary requirements by default. If the ﬁrst
ﬁle is longer then in our example, and spans e.g., n pieces in
the torrent ﬁle, any of these areas on disc can identify the
ﬁle as long as the data is stored consecutively somewhere.
The second piece in Fig. 2 is not usable for our proposed
methodology, as it contains both content from the ﬁrst and
the second ﬁle. While it could theoretically happen that the
operating system allocates the information in such a way
that the hash value could be used, this is not necessarily the
case as the ﬁles can be stored at different locations on the
hard drive and in different ordering. The third piece (the
second piece that contains content from movie.mkv in our
example) is usable if the missing length of the ﬁle in the
beginning is used for offset hashing e it is no longer the
piece_length which can be used for chunk hashing during
acquisition, but rather aligned to the hard drive sectors,
which tremendously increases the hash values to be
calculated during analysis. Again, this is already integrated
in bulk_extractor, and the problem remains CPU-bound
which means it is solvable if enough computation power
is at hand. The hash value for the last piece is unusable, as it
must not be of the same length as the others (Cohen) i.e.,
there is no padding for torrent ﬁles.
In the following, we discuss the different use cases
where such a vast amount of ﬁle fragment information can
be of use in the particular context of digital forensics. Other
protocols are probably equally suitable, but have not been
investigated in detail in this work e.g., Kademlia
(Maymounkov and Mazieres, 2002) as well as distributed
hash tables in general (Steiner et al., 2009) often use SHA-1
hash values for searching.
Use case 1: ﬁle whitelisting
File whitelisting is a well-known technique to identify
ﬁles during an early phase in digital investigations that are
common and of no particular interest. One of the most
commonly used database of hash values is the NIST Na-
tional Software Reference Library (NSRL) reference data
set,1 which comprises at the time of writing of more than
43 million ﬁle hash values. Most of these hash values
Fig. 1. File content in a torrent ﬁle.
Fig. 2. Chunk hashes.
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Windows, whereas our collected data contains information
of relevance independent of the used operating system and
of much larger ﬁle size. While NIST also releases block hash
values for the ﬁrst 4 k and 8 k of about 13 million ﬁles, our
dataset is able to identify popular ﬁles like movies, TV ep-
isodes or other commonly shared ﬁles on ﬁle sharing net-
works, even if it is deleted and some sectors were already
overwritten by the ﬁle system.Use case 2: ﬁle blacklisting
File blacklisting is used to ﬁnd and identify ﬁles of
particular interest for a speciﬁc investigation. While in our
evaluation the usability of our data is mostly limited to
cases of copyright infringement, it is still of use for in-
vestigations in general and might lead to new insights.
Nonetheless, building a private sub-ﬁle hash database is
always a possibility where a script can be used to hash
blocks of arbitrary length of e.g. all email attachments in a
company, all ﬁles on a Sharepoint server or source code
within a company. This could also include outright illegal
material like pictures and videos related to child pornog-
raphy. Instead of using perceptional hashing (Breitinger
et al) as used by online services like Twitter and Facebook
today to detect such ﬁles (Ith), sub-ﬁle hash values of var-
iable block length can further identify such ﬁles without
access to such perceptionally hashed data.Use case 3: ﬁle fragment identiﬁcation
File systems in modern operating systems by default, do
not overwrite ﬁles once they are deleted but rather delete
the index pointing to the data or mark the affected storage
areas as free-to-use (Carrier, 2005). Depending on the
operating system and the ﬁle-system in use, as well as the
actual user behavior, it is usually not predictable when a
speciﬁc area will be overwritten. Both methods in our
approach described so far work likewise for partially over-
written ﬁles, as they do not rely on ﬁle system metadata at
all. This was already argued in (Young et al., 2012) for sector
hashing. As long as the data on disc is not completely
overwritten and leaves at minimum the piece length of the
torrent ﬁles untouched, PeekaTorrent will ﬁnd it.
Shifting the bottleneck
Considering these three use cases, the overall perfor-
mance scales linearly with the number of available CPU-
cores, similar to bulk_extractor. Sub-ﬁle hashing can
leverage multi-core CPUs and scales with the number of
available cores. As the ﬁle system metadata is not needed,
there is no need for disk seeks. All the data from the hard
drive can be split in constant-size chunks, and processed
recursively using the hashdb scanner within bulk_extractor.
Evaluation
To evaluate our methodology we implemented
numerous steps of the processing outline described above.
This includes software wewrote to collect torrent ﬁles from
the open Internet, and tools to process and use themwithin
the context of a forensic investigation, see https://www.
peekatorrent.org. This section shows and underlines the
applicability of the proposed approach and the methods
applied for gathering torrents on a large scale.
Data collection
Collecting a large number of torrents from the open
Internet is non-trivial, as new torrents are added constantly
and older torrents become unavailable once they are no
S. Neuner et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S149eS156 S153longer shared. Only a minority of websites host the torrent
ﬁles containing all the sub-ﬁle hash values themselves, but
rather rely on sharing magnet links that point to the in-
formation in the completely decentralized distributed hash
tables (DHTs) (Zhang et al., 2011).
For collecting torrent ﬁles we focused on the following
three main sources: (i) The Pirate Bay,2 (ii) kickassTorrents3
and (iii) various data dumps e.g. from openBay.4 For (i) and
(ii) we implemented a crawling framework which recur-
sively crawls and parses both websites for every magnet
link listed there. After that we extracted the torrent info_-
hashes from the magnet links, and constructed a download
link for the torrent cache website https://torcache.net/. For
(iii) and those torrent ﬁles which weren't hosted at
torcache.net we implemented a DHT lookup service,
similar to the one Wolchok et al. used in their work
(Wolchok and Halderman, 2010). The crawlers for (i) and
(ii) were crawling the entire websites, including all sub-
categories to get the full archive for a speciﬁc point in time
(January 2016 in our case).
From the various openBay dumps we were able to
extract close to 30 million info_hashes. The dataset from
isohunt contained 7.8 million info_hashes, while the com-
plete archive for openBay included 23.5 million hashes.
Both data sets were created after the police raid against
Pirate Bay in December 2014 caused the website to be shut
down. Previously generated data sets also include one
notable xml dumps of the Pirate Bay from February 2013
(about 2 million info_hash values). Not all of these ﬁles
were retrievable using the DHTs, in fact only a small frac-
tion and in particular only newer ﬁles. The biggest fraction
of torrent ﬁles we collected came from kickassTorrents and
torcache.net, as torcache.net is used by default to distribute
torrent ﬁles on behalf of kickassTorrents. So far we have
collected 2.3 million torrent ﬁles, which we share with the
reviewers and later will release them publicly. Our data
collection is still going on, and as such the datawe collected
can be only considered a snapshot in time. Further pro-
cessing was then done using Python as well as hashdb,
which was used to efﬁciently store and query the sub-ﬁle
hash values.Theoretic evaluation
Fragmentation of ﬁles can be a limiting factor using real
cases, as for each time a ﬁle is fragmented one chunk (of
arbitrary length) is no longer identiﬁable. Since there is not
yet a public instance of a SHA-1 pre-image attack, ﬁnding a
small number of chunks using PeekaTorrent has a very
small likelihood to be coincidentally, and can be used for
further analysis steps during the investigation. Compared
to previous work (Young et al., 2012; Garﬁnkel and
McCarrin, 2015) the number of false positives is greatly
reduced, as the block length used for hashing is larger than
the previously used sector/cluster size of 512 or 4096 bytes.
Hashing a larger ﬁle block e.g., 256 kilobytes, drastically2 https://thepiratebay.se/ and its alternative TLDs.
3 https://kat.cr/.
4 https://github.com/isohuntto/openbay-db-dump.reduces the probability of resulting in the same hash value
(for all ﬁles independent of each other). This also implies
that shared ﬁle content across ﬁles, such as the ramping
structure for Microsoft Ofﬁce ﬁles as discussed in (Young
et al., 2012), is evaded as the block length increases.
Results
Overall, we collected and analyzed more than
2.3 million torrent ﬁles. These torrents comprise 3.3 billion
block hash values. From these 3.3 billion block hash values,
approximately 48% (or 1.62 billion hash block values) are
usable to identify million ﬁles using various block length.
Another 50% (or 1.66 billion hash block values) are usable
even though the ﬁles do not align with the torrent chunk-
ing. 1.1% of the 3.3 billion hash values (or 39 million hash
block values) are not usable in our approach, as the blocks
and their corresponding hashes comprise content of two or
more ﬁles. The exact numbers for the most popular torrent
block lengths of 2n (for various n) is shown in Table 1, with
exotic chunk sizes omitted (n ¼ 2871) for the sake of
brevity.
From the 2.3 million torrent ﬁles we are able to identify
2.6 petabytes of data using TeekaTorrent, or 32million ﬁles.
Regarding only the most common chunk sizes with
100,000 ormore torrent ﬁles found using ourmethodology,
we are left with 2.1 million torrents. The pre-computed
hashdb databases, as well as the raw torrent ﬁles and the
source code used for this paper can be found on ourwebsite
https://www.peekatorrent.org.
hashdb
We then imported the usable sub-ﬁle hash values for all
torrents with a piece length of 256 k into hashdb (Garﬁnkel
and McCarrin, 2015). As it can be seen in Table 1, this sums
up to 631 million hash values. From these 631 million only
474 million are unique, due to duplicate sub-ﬁle hash
values. This is due to the fact that the same ﬁles can be
contained in different torrents, e.g. duplicates for each
kickassTorrents and Pirate Bay. Torrent ﬁles that became
repackaged with different ﬁles or ﬁle ordering can be
another reason to cause this rather large discrepancy.
hashdb can then be used to deny that a given sub-ﬁle hash
value is part of the database using Bloom ﬁlters. Otherwise
the database is queried, and both ﬁlename and info_hash
are returned if a corresponding hash value is found. All the
features and APIs provided by hashdb are thus fully usable,
and the entire project is well documented and active.5
While the majority of sub-ﬁle hash values are unique
within the data we collected (474 million), the long tail of
duplicates can be seen in Fig. 3. The x-axis accounts for the
number of duplicates found, starting from hash values with
10 duplicates or more. Note that the y-axis is log-scale. In
the data there are also 17.8 million distinct sub-ﬁle hashes
that occurs twice, 2.5 million that occur three times, and
about 440,000 that occur four times. We speculate that
these hashes are again caused by some form of release5 https://github.com/NPS-DEEP/hashdb.
Table 1
Results of data collection, for 2.3 million torrent ﬁles.
Block length Torrents Chunks Usable chunks Offset chunks Unusable chunks
16 k 75 k 146 m 123 m 84% 22 m 15% 305 k
32 k 95 k 171 m 112 m 65% 58 m 34% 662 k
64 k 335 k 217 m 124 m 57% 90 m 41% 2 m
128 k 201 k 227 m 115 m 50% 109 m 48% 2 m
256 k 669 k 1.329 b 631 m 47% 690 m 51% 8 m
512 k 297 k 401 m 201 m 50% 194 m 48% 5 m
1024 k 307 k 357 m 165 m 46% 187 m 52% 5 m
2048k 170 k 201 m 75 m 37% 121 m 60% 4 m
4096 k 161 k 229 m 58 m 25% 162 m 70% 8 m
8192 k 18 k 27 m 8 m 30% 17 m 65% 975 k
16384 k 2 k 3 m 315 k 9% 2 m 84% 198 k
Sum: 2.3 m 3.314 b 1.615 b 48% 1.658 b 50% 39 m
Fig. 3. Distribution of sub-ﬁle hash duplicates.
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number of duplicates observed was caused by one partic-
ular hash that occurs 8,462,788 times. We would speculate
that this is caused by the “null” hash, for data areas that
contain only zeros.Real runtime on limited hardware
To evaluate our approach furthermore, we took a 5-year
old notebook and created a one gigabyte image from a USB
thumb drive. The notebook was a Lenovo X200s, with a
Core 2 Duo processor (L9400), 4 GB of RAM and a regular
hard drive. On the thumb drivewe stored the ISO ﬁle for the
current version of Ubuntu Desktop, which we downloaded
over BitTorrent. We created a fresh hashdb database, and
seeded it with the extracted SHA-1 hashes of the torrent
ﬁle. Overall, we extracted 1158 hash values for the Ubuntu
image, the chunk size was 512 k. We then used a custom
module for bulk_extractor to generate SHA-1 hashes of all
blocks bulk_extractor processes, and disabled all other
plugins.
Running bulk_extractor with solely the SHA-1 plugin
activated on the notebook took 220 s to process the 1 GB
image ﬁle. Since the CPU has two cores, two threads were
spawned to process the image. From the 1158 chunks, 1154
were successfully identiﬁed using PeekaTorrent. Threechunks could not be found since the ﬁle was stored frag-
mented in three fragments (veriﬁedmanually using ﬁwalk),
and the last hash value is unusable as it has a different
chunk length. Running the same analysis on amodern Xeon
with 8 cores plus Hyper-Threading, it took less than 23 s.
Running the same image against the hashdb database of all
474 million chunk hashes took 38 s. Since we do not aim to
evaluate the performance of either bulk_extractor or
hashdb, we do not go into details of further performance
numbers. Also, the average fragmentation on hard drives
depends heavily on the type of usage, size and operating
system. Measuring this for the average case is beyond the
scope of this paper.Discussion
Our results show that a rather large number of block
hash values is usable for identifying ﬁles based on the data
we collected from BitTorrent ﬁles, somewhere close to 98%.
Due to the nature of ﬁle sharing networks and the content
distributed there we assume that this is possibly biased due
to the fact that these networks commonly share large ﬁles
like movies in high quality. We did not investigate the
distribution of ﬁlename, ﬁle sizes and to what extend one
can expect that the largest ﬁle is the ﬁrst in the torrent ﬁle.
We assume that this is speciﬁc to the application that
created the torrent, as this is not speciﬁed in the ﬁle format
of BitTorrent (Cohen).
Half of the usable chunk hashes come with an arbitrary
offset due to the placement of the affected ﬁles. This is
caused by the particularities of BitTorrent ﬁles. However,
since bulk_extractor processes pages of memory without
any ﬁle system information, these artefacts are also
retrievable (as long as the ﬁle is larger than the chunk size).
Other sources for sub-ﬁle hashing have to be investigated,
like other P2P protocols or cloud storage solutions such as
Dropbox. We expect similar functionality from other cloud
storage solutions like Google Drive, OwnCloud or Microsoft
OneDrive as well, where the local data structures could be
used as a source for history hash values. Still, using the data
we collected we can identify up to 2.6 petabytes of data for
3.3 billion chunks. We expect these values to increase, as
we will keep collecting data and publishing it on our
website.
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many scenarios can come to mind. For one it depends on
the data sources used for seeding the sub-ﬁle hashing e
this can be for example all sent email attachments in a
company, a stack of sensitive cooperate documents or
encrypted data blobs in the cooperate context. Secondly,
this can be easily enlarged by investigators by adding data
from private repositories of interesting ﬁles, ﬁle archives or
any other data source at hand like USB thumb drives or
portable hard drives, and hashing it in sub-ﬁle chunks.
Another example could be the cross-linking of ﬁles be-
tween hard drives: if any of the hard drives during an
investigation is hashed with a particular chunk size, all
other related drives can be using this information to
identify non-fragmented overlaps. After all, this was obvi-
ously the original motivation behind the tight connection
between bulk_extractor and hashdb. Foremost, Peek-
aTorrent allows for hard drives without any meta infor-
mation at all, to ﬁnd clues on the content as long as the hard
drive is not encrypted.
Limitations
While 2.6 petabytes of identiﬁable ﬁles sounds like a lot,
its usefulness depends on the particular kind of investiga-
tion. If the goal is to whitelist as many ﬁles and ﬁle frag-
ments as possible on a diverse set of machines, then our
approach looks promising. As always in digital forensics, it
depends however on the speciﬁc context of the in-
vestigations, and the questions of interest. Formore speciﬁc
investigations it depends on the type and volume of data e
creating sub-ﬁle hash values of variable block length is
easily scriptable, so if a large repository of ﬁles is available,
our methodology is applicable. This can be for example all
attachments from a mail server, malicious ﬁles like mal-
ware from anti-virus companies, or even smaller sets of
ﬁles with a direct connection to an investigation.
Another limitation is the behavior of storage devices,
operating systems and ﬁle systems: SSDs regularly delete
artefacts within the free space using the TRIM command
(Bonetti et al., 2013), and depending on the operating
system and ﬁle system, fragmentation can occur. There are
no current numbers on the amount of fragmentation
happening, with the latest study on ﬁle system metadata
being already close to a decade old (Agrawal et al., 2007).
Also, the approach only works for ﬁles which have at least a
ﬁle size bigger then the hashing window, or the torrent
piece length respectively. Based on our ﬁndings with
PeekaTorrent, only ﬁles with a minimal size of 16 kilobytes
are identiﬁable, while the vast amount of ﬁles needs to
have at least 256 kilobytes due to the nature of the seeding
data.
Future work
For future work we plan to evaluate our approach using
real hard drives and/or cases. It is generally hard to ﬁnd
representative cases or hard drives, but measuring the
applicability of PeekaTorrent is our next step. Furthermore,
we plan to investigate the usage of GPUs for variable block
length hashing. We also plan to make our tools and datacollections more readily applicable, by releasing tools for
creating and querying sub-ﬁle hash values easy as part of
the forensic process. Lastly, our data collection could be
enhanced by focusing on popular ﬁle torrents, and by col-
lecting more ﬁles over time (which is expected to continue
for the near future) and from additional torrent websites as
well as from DHT crawlers.
Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated how vast amounts
of sub-ﬁle hash values can be of use in digital forensics. We
evaluated the idea using torrent ﬁles from popular ﬁle
sharing platforms, and collected more than 2.3 million
torrent ﬁles for our analysis. Based on these torrent ﬁles we
extracted more then 3 billion SHA-1 sub-ﬁle hash values,
and are able to identify up to 32 million ﬁles or 2.6 peta-
bytes of information using this data set. Both, the collected
data as well as the written software tools are available
under open source licenses.
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